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1 For Baudelaire, art criticism was in part bound up with what makes half of art itself (the
other half being its eternal part): “the transitory, the fleeting, the contingent”1. The fact
is  that  for some thirty years he have lost  oblivion,  for if  we retain its  psychological
faculty, our computer-like memories–flexible extensions, no less–do store things. How is
criticism possible when oblivion no longer is? It is possible thus to formulate the crisis of
criticism which each publication here considered strives to describe, conceive and ward
off.
2 From Fermigier, with an anthology provided by Françoise Cachin and Adrien Goetz, to
Rochlitz,  the  reader  witnesses  the  shift,  essentially  on  the  same level,  from ease  to
malaise. Fermigier, who was apparently little concerned with the art contemporary with
him, happily commented on the effort of memory made by curators after the Second
Word War, tending to exhume 19th century art. Fermigier criticized; he discriminated,
appraised, and compared; he failed to see  that the work of curatorship, modern in this
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sense, was aimed at nothing less than once and for all denying the oblivion in which the
official conventional masters had been buried–that it was aimed at showing everything
and presenting everything. Fermigier, last of the happy critics. Rochlitz painfully knew
that everything is henceforth here forever but, with Don Quixotism (the term is not used
in  any  derogatory  sense  here),  also  that  things  cannot  be  resolved  by  criticism
renouncing its power of judgement–of condemning, if such a thing is possible, to oblivion.
In order to find the strength to no longer be merely laudatory, criticism would have to
philosophically underpin the reasons for its verdict. The aesthetic foundation of forms of
critical  judgement  would  have  the  effect  of  reducing  the  dispersal  of  opinions,
encouraging discussion rather than dispute; argumentation is a strength. Rochlitz offers
as  examples  his  own  critical  works,  where  seriosity  appears  like  the  stitching  of
subjectivity.  For  this  is  the  nature  of  the  tragic  crisis:  in  order  to  save  judgement,
criticism must sacrifice taste.
3 The visual form of the present, of this total and permanent present of absolute memory,
is  presence;  the  fact,  for  artworks,  not  only  of  being  all  there  (“good  and  bad”,  as
Fermigier put it), but also of being offered as proximity, trying to exercise a seduction (in
the etymological sense) by reduction of the distance that has to be covered as far as self.
The  proximity  in  which  many  contemporary  art  events  are  held  has  long  been
understood as a critical faculty gained by art: by renouncing any form of pedestal, frame
and other historical and haughty marker of distance, art would infiltrate society and,
within it, with a new effectiveness, liberate its critical and subversive charge. Now, based
on a reading of the minutes of a recent conference, this topos of the critical function of
art  is  cracking:  Elisabeth  Lebovici  shows  the  risks  of  abolishing  the  distance,  then
describes the means of warding them off. But her conclusion is pessimistic: the proximity
of art gradually dissolves it in the way in which its critical function is drowned. However,
the impression that emerged from the diversity of the contributions to the conference
was  rather  that  of  a  criticism of  the  topos  of  the  critical  function  of  art  than of  a
questioning of this function itself.
4 The other great form of absolute memory, this time regarding the distance as such and no
longer its practical or virtual abolition, is memorization: history, storage, and reporting.
This basically modern project, which the “Archives de la critique d’art” embrace even
unto their name, underpinned the conference, L’Invention de la critique d’art.  Inventing
means this: bringing to presence. Today, because we are in a mnesic system, art criticism
is being invented everywhere (for example, here, in South America, too) by everyone
(here: feminists, jazz-lovers) and, above all, all the time2. Over and above interest specific
to each contribution, the Rennes conference thus extended in its actual principle to the
problem of criticism, while at the same time contributing, through its storage vocation, to
nurture it: is a piece of art criticism possible when, with everything being memorized,
there is  no longer anything “transitory,  fleeting”, nor any choice to be made,  whose
sanction would be oblivion? Or, alternatively, is a critical history of criticism now the
only thing that is possible and desirable–in other words, a narrative where a reflective
consciousness would trace its path through quasi-exhaustive archives? Contributions in
L’Invention  de  la  critique  d’art and in  Art  de  proximité  &  distance  critique reinstated the
possibility of the “transitory” and the “fleeting” within memory itself.  Pierre-Damien
Huygues called upon Hume to reintroduce something akin to a weakness. According to
Hume, he explained, most of our judgements recount between them various events that
have affected our memory, postulating a causal link which does not logically exist: we
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speculate  upon  reason  precisely  where  our  mental,  and  essentially  memory-related
activity  merely  makes  a  “mention”.  In  so  far  as  aesthetic  experience,  of  which  art
criticism is the discourse, is essentially a mention (being intrinsically bound up with the
experience of the work), an apodictic judgement is impossible, and its speculation alone
(proceeding  as  if  it  were  logical)  is  permissible.  Criticism  thus  seems  still  possible,
whether it subtends the weakness of the mention or whether it postulates reason for
itself, because even when memory becomes absolute, the link between the objects (or
facts) that it recounts remains rationally weak, and speculation on this link desirable.
Pierre-Henry  Frangne  described  the  movement  (historical,  as  well  as  ontological,  or
programmatic)  of  criticism  via  Mallarmé  “thinker  of  crisis  as  of  the  movement  of
suspense”. Mallarmé, a most singular reader of Hegel; and this point is also the one where
memory,  albeit  absolute,  includes–“upheaval”–the  instance  of  its  denial:  at  the  very
moment when language names it, the fact attains its “vibratory quasi-disappearance”. Art
criticism thus seems possible as long as it is capable of declining its object, and its own
history draws it into it. As for this history, taken at the level of its recent instatement,
that of the AICA, if  we are to believe Ramon Tio Bellido,  it  turns out that it  is itself
sporadic, leaving room for the efforts of storage and oblivion.
NOTES
1. Baudelaire, Charles. “Le Peintre de la vie moderne”, in Ecrits esthétiques, Paris : U.G.E., 1986, p.
372.
2. In the Graeco-Latin culture, in the 16th century, in the 18th century, in the 19th century–
photography–, in the 20th century–film and jazz.
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